top of page

Burberry and the Accessible-Luxury Challenge

  • Administrateur
  • Jun 16
  • 5 min read

For many years associated with the khaki trench coat and camel tartan, Burberry remains one of the few independent luxury houses listed in London. After weathering the pandemic shock, the brand now faces an abrupt slowdown: revenue fell from £3.1 billion in 2022/23 to £2.97 billion in 2023/24, then to £2.46 billion in the fiscal year ended 29 March 2025, while the adjusted operating margin collapsed from 14 % to 1 %. This 1,500-word memo unpacks the drivers of that decline, gauges the financial risks and outlines the levers the new management team intends to pull to restore profitable growth.


Activities and business model


Burberry rests on three pillars:

  • Ready-to-wear (men 30 %, women 29 %, children 5 %): the utilitarian DNA—trench, parka, gabardine—is complemented by fashion lines entrusted since 2023 to creative director Daniel Lee.

  • Accessories (36 % of retail/wholesale sales): bags, small leather goods, scarves, belts and shoes; a strategic segment for trading up but highly competitive.

  • Licences: mainly fragrance (contract with Coty) and eyewear, which generate high margins but only 2 % of consolidated revenue.


The network numbers 455 points of sale—227 directly operated stores, 139 department-store concessions, 33 franchises and 56 outlets—augmented by a global e-commerce site that now accounts for more than 15 % of retail sales. The brand is also testing phygital experiences (augmented reality on Snapchat, “social commerce” on Tmall) to attract younger shoppers.


Geography: Asia’s decisive weight


Between 2019 and 2024 Burberry maintained a broadly similar footprint across the three main regions, yet Asia’s share of revenue ex-licences rose from 40 % to 44 %. Mainland China, Hong Kong and South Korea now form the largest customer base. Post-COVID normalisation, China’s property crisis and higher precautionary savings have slashed local demand: the fourth quarter of 2024/25 shows –19 % in China and –17 % in Asia-Pacific. Duty-free shopping tours in Europe have partly offset this, lifting EMEIA to 35 % of the total, while the Americas stagnate at 21 %.


Store numbers changed little but the mix shifted markedly: unprofitable flagships in Southern Europe were closed, flagship sites opened in Shenzhen and Seoul, and key stores (Paris Rivoli, New-York SoHo) were fully refitted to support the premium repositioning.



ree


Shareholding structure and capital allocation


Ownership is fragmented: Lindsell Train (6.1 %), Schroders (5.4 %), Vanguard (4.4 %) and Norges Bank (3.2 %) anchor the institutional base. With no controlling shareholder, management sought to bolster the share price through heavy buy-backs (£400 million in 2022/23).


Funded from cash, that policy reduced the free float but also the liquidity cushion: net cash fell from £961 million to £362 million in March 2024, then swung to net debt of £90 million after the £450 million bond issue in 2025 aimed at refinancing short-term maturities. Management therefore suspended the dividend for 2024/25 to preserve resources.


Competitive positioning: accessible luxury or aspiring luxury?


Burberry claims a 168-year heritage and European manufacturing, yet its price positioning is mid-range: a “Knight” bag at £3,000 sits well above Coach’s premium lines, but far below a Hermès “Kelly” at €9,000. In the “accessible luxury” segment already served by Michael Kors or Ferragamo, the price escalation launched under Riccardo Tisci sometimes blurred the message; Daniel Lee now aims for “a broader price spectrum without diluting the aura”.


Financial trajectory 2019-2025


  • Pre-COVID (FY 2019/20): revenue £2.63 bn, operating margin 15 %.

  • Pandemic (FY 2020/21): –3 % at constant FX; digital push cushioned the impact, but free cash flow dropped to £272 m.

  • Rebound (FY 2021/22-2022/23): strong recovery in China and Korea, sales to £3.09 bn, margin 21 %, record cash £961 m.

  • Inflexion (FY 2023/24): revenue –4 % to £2.97 bn, margin 14 %, FCF £65 m, stocks +16 %.

  • Hard landing (FY 2024/25): revenue –17 % to £2.46 bn, margin 1 %, negative EPS. Overstocking forced markdowns, trimming gross margin by c. 170 bp, while fixed costs (rents, retail payroll, refits) could not be cut as fast.


Why did sales collapse?


  1. Adverse macro-economy: persistent OECD inflation, higher rates and shrinking purchasing power among the upper-middle-class—the core of accessible luxury.

  2. China in convalescence: the post-reopening rebound petered out; travelling Chinese shoppers favour Europe for tax-free benefits, leaving local boutiques under-trafficked.

  3. Price repositioning: a swift 40 % hike on a flagship bag in four years alienated historic customers without fully convincing ultra-luxury seekers, still loyal to Louis Vuitton.

  4. Distribution under-optimised: voluntary shutdown of big wholesale accounts (–35 % in FY 24) removed volume before own retail could gain productivity.

  5. Collection calendar: the creative hand-off from Tisci to Lee left a “blank spot”; Lee’s first products shipped only in spring 2024, limiting the novelty effect.


Profitability squeezed: volume, mix and cost


Half the fall in operating profit stems from the £500 m revenue contraction; the other half from:

  • Gross margin: markdowns to clear stock; inflation in high-end materials; dearer air freight.

  • SG&A: +7 % at constant FX; media relaunch for the “Knight Blue” line and refurbishing 50 stores (CAPEX £151 m in 2024/25).

  • Currency effect: a firm pound versus CNY and USD shaved £55 m off revenue and £10 m off profit.


Financial position: sound but slimmer


  • Gross cash (29 Mar 2025): £360 m

  • Gross debt: £450 m (2025-2030 bond, 3.4 %)

  • Net debt: £90 m

  • Covenants: target net-debt/EBITDA < 2×; adjusted EBITDA 2024/25 is £150 m—barely a cushion.


The balance sheet is still healthy, but cash generation has dipped below the natural funding level for investment. Suspending the dividend and the £80 m structural cost-saving plan for 2025/26 aim to rebuild liquidity before reigniting organic growth.


“Burberry Forward” strategy: five relaunch levers


  1. Restore product desirability: Daniel Lee recentres the offer on five icons—trench, “Castleford” gabardine, Knight bag, Shield loafer, Check scarf—scaled across more entry prices.

  2. Tighten distribution: deeper outlet cuts, exit of low-quality concessions and an allocation model à la Hermès to freeze stock and create scarcity.

  3. Inventory optimisation: “Scarcity” programme targeting –10 % stock volume and 10-month rotation, backed by an AI demand-forecasting module.

  4. Cost & CAPEX discipline: annual envelope £130 m (vs £180 m pre-COVID) and an opex-saving plan of £80 m over two years, £24 m already delivered.

  5. Brand storytelling: global “The Knight is back” campaign shot by Mert & Marcus, AR gamification on Roblox and a partnership with Manchester United to reach the Gen-Z worldwide.


Management targets £3 bn revenue and a double-digit operating margin by 2027 without external M&A.


Risks and catalysts


Risks: escalation of the US-China trade war; prolonged Chinese macro weakness; fiercer competition in affordable luxury (Tapestry-Capri, Prada-Miu Miu); reliance on a handful of icons; execution risk on the cost-saving plan.


Catalysts: full tourist reopening in APAC; commercial success of Lee’s first collections; stock normalisation triggering a mechanical gross-margin rebound; owner-operated e-commerce ramp-up (expected 300 bp conversion uplift); potential take-over interest from a luxury conglomerate or sovereign fund.


Conclusion


Backed by powerful intangible assets, a global network and a still-sound balance sheet, Burberry lacks neither history nor resources. The challenge is to execute a more coherent repositioning at speed: restore scarcity, rekindle creative “buzz” and rebuild a sustainable cost base. If “Burberry Forward” can lift the margin above 10 % within three years, the share could reclaim its FTSE 100 berth and its status as the benchmark of British luxury. Failing that, the house risks becoming prime prey for a consolidator seeking a heritage label. Fiscal 2025/26—already flagged as “challenging”—will be decisive to judge whether the trench-coat knight can once again gallop with the global luxury champions.




Recent Posts

See All

Comments


Privacy Policy

Legal Notice

Cookie Policy

bottom of page